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ABSTRACT
To calculate regulatory capital ratios, banks have to apply adjustments to book equity.
These regulatory adjustments vary with a bank’s solvency position. Low-solvency banks
report values of Tier 1 capital that exceed book equity. They use regulatory adjustments to
inflate regulatory solvency ratios such as the Tier 1 leverage ratio and the Tier 1 risk-based
capital ratio. In contrast, highly solvent banks report Tier 1 capital that is lower than book
equity. These banks adjust their solvency ratios downward for prudential reasons, despite
their resilient solvency levels. These results weaken the case for regulatory adjustments.
The decreasing relationship between regulatory adjustments and bank solvency reflects
the cost of deleveraging, a cost that demonstrates the resistance of banks to substituting
equity for debt.
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THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS prompted renewed attention to bank capital. In the
wake of the crisis, rules on regulatory capital are changing. New capital rules (Basel III) have
entered into force (BCBS 2010, EC 2013, OCC 2013). In anticipation of these rules, banks
have been increasing the level of regulatory capital (BCBS 2013a).
The attention to bank capital is focused predominantly on the levels of capital, although
opinions on the benefits and costs of bank capital vary. Whereas Mehran and Thakor (2011),
Admati et al. (2013a), and Berger and Bouwman (2013) highlight the benefits of increased lev-
els of bank capital, others highlight the drawbacks (e.g., Diamond and Rajan 2001, Kashyap
et al. 2008, DeAngelo and Stulz 2013). Others also highlight the benefits of convertible cap-
ital: debt that can be converted when a bank’s capital level drops below a certain threshold
(Flannery 2005, French et al. 2010, Herring and Calomiris 2011, Pennacchi et al. 2011).
Surprisingly little has been written about the structure, or the quality, of regulatory capital.
This lack of attention to the structure of regulatory capital is surprising for two reasons.
First, regulation alters the structure of regulatory bank capital. Bank capital rules require
banks to apply adjustments to book equity to calculate regulatory capital—where book eq-
uity is the starting point of the calculation of regulatory capital and solvency ratios (Federal
Reserve 2005, FDIC 2012, OCC 2012, EC 2013).
The adjustments are intended to exclude from capital items that do not contribute to the
safety and soundness of the banking system, but include items that augment the quantity of
regulatory capital.
Examples of items that are deducted from book equity are goodwill, deferred tax assets,
minority interests, and unrealized gains on securities held for sale.
Examples of items included in regulatory capital are specific subordinated debt securities
and unrealized losses on available-for-sale debt securities (Federal Reserve 2005, 12 CFR 225
2012).
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Because of the regulatory adjustments, regulatory capital differs from “accounting capital”
or book equity. This paper shows that the regulatory adjustments, relative to equity, increase
(decrease) Tier 1 capital up to 311 basis points (bp) (443 bp) of total assets. These differences
are amplified by leverage and warrant attention from banks and regulators.
Second, bank solvency regulation does pay attention to the structure of regulatory capital.
For example, Basel III aims to raise both the quantity and the quality of regulatory capital
(BCBS 2010, sections 8 and 9). Moreover, the discussions on the structure of capital, i.e., on
which items can or cannot count as regulatory capital, are often heated. They also tend to drag
on. A case in point is the controversy around the Basel Committee’s preliminary “Regulatory
Consistency Assessment” of 2012. The adverse assessment outcome prompted the European
Commission to make an exceptional announcement that publicly defended the proposed new
European bank capital rules (BCBS 2012, EC 2012, Goldstein 2012). Another example, which
will be discussed in this paper, is the ongoing discussion of the inclusion of unrealized gains
and losses in regulatory capital.
The reasons above prompt the question: What do we know about the empirical effects of
regulatory adjustments on the structure of regulatory capital?
To answer that question, this paper examines Tier 1 regulatory adjustments: items that
banks can and cannot include in Tier 1 capital and thus affect the structure of regulatory
capital. This paper examines how banks apply these regulatory adjustments and assesses
whether the adjustments satisfy regulators’ concerns about the safety and soundness of the
banking system.
For a large sample of US bank holding companies over the years 2001–2013, this paper
presents empirical evidence of regulatory adjustments, which are adjustments that banks are
required to apply to book equity to calculate Tier 1 regulatory capital, which is the numerator
of two important bank solvency ratios: the Tier 1 leverage ratio and the Tier 1 risk-based
capital ratio.
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The main finding of this paper is that the relationship between regulatory adjustments and
bank solvency declines with solvency. Weaker banks in particular benefit from regulatory ad-
justments. These banks report Tier 1 capital that exceeds book equity. They rely on regulatory
adjustments to inflate the solvency ratios reported to their supervisors. In contrast, highly
solvent banks report low regulatory solvency ratios relative to ratios based on book equity.
Moreover, the relationship between solvency and regulatory adjustments is convex: The
effects of regulatory adjustments monotonically decline with bank solvency.
This paper contributes to the literature by showing that banks use regulatory adjustments
to manage Tier 1 capital. Specifically: Low-solvency banks use adjustments to increase Tier 1
capital, and high-solvency banks display a higher incidence of regulatory adjustments that
decrease Tier 1 capital. In addition, the paper shows that the use of regulatory adjustments
mirrors the option value of equity, which peaks in low-solvency banks. The results presented
in this paper are the first concerning Tier 1 regulatory capital choice and present empirical
evidence consistent with the leverage ratchet effect of Admati et al. (2013b).
The results in the present paper indicate a limited effectiveness of bank solvency rules
regarding regulatory adjustments to preserve capital. In fact, the rules work to the advantage
of weaker banks. These banks are “helped” (or choose to be helped) by rules that allow
them to augment regulatory capital by using items that have not consistently proven their
contribution to the safety and soundness of the banking system (French et al. 2010, ASIC
2013). Conversely, highly solvent banks are required to adjust their solvency ratios downward
for prudential reasons. Given their resilient capital ratios, we may question the relevance of
regulatory adjustments for these banks.
In addition, the results show that banks respond to the rules governing regulatory adjust-
ments. Provided that the rules governing regulatory adjustments are carefully developed, the
rules have prudential merits. However, some of the deductions may be the result of a willing-
ness among standard setters to conform to an international level playing field. This may also
limit the effectiveness of the regulatory adjustments.
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With the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision gathering views on the risk-based sol-
vency approach, this paper may contribute to the debate on the choice of a measure of solvency
(BCBS 2013b).
1. BACKGROUND: LITERATURE AND REGULATION
1.1 Literature
The existing literature on regulatory adjustments originates mainly from accounting stud-
ies that focus on the allowance for loan and lease losses includible in Tier 2 capital. See, for
example, Kim and Kross (1998) and Ramesh and Revsine (2000). Ng and Roychowdhury
(2011) document a positive association between the allowance for loan and lease losses in-
cludible in Tier 2 capital, an “add-back” to capital, and the risk of bank failure. Their study
confirms the results of Laeven and Majnoni (2003), who show that banks tend to postpone
provisioning. Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011) show that accounting rules that rely on
the recognition of incurred losses (instead of expected losses) are an incentive to postpone
provisioning. In doing so, accounting rules may frustrate the prudential objectives of Tier 2
capital.
Results of studies examining Tier 2 capital may not be generalizable for all banks, in
particular for going-concern banks. Tier 2 capital is increasingly seen as “gone concern”
capital. Its role in going concern is limited and diminishing. As opposed to Tier 1 capital,
which absorbs losses in going concern by the deduction of losses from book equity, Tier 2
capital acts as a buffer that can be drawn down to limit “losses given default.” Tier 1 should
reduce the probability of a bank defaulting. New bank solvency rules, e.g., Basel III, formalize
these two separate roles of Tier 1 and Tier 2. The former has a going-concern role, and the
latter has a gone-concern role (BCBS 2010, 2011).
In the literature on regulatory capital, there is broad agreement that bank capital is expen-
sive. Two important factors that drive the high cost of bank capital are subsidized debt and the
benefits forgone by less-intense creditor monitoring.
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Tax deductibility of debt increases firm value with leverage (Modigliani and Miller 1963).
As the probability of default increases with leverage, banks may limit their indebtedness to
the levels observed in corporate firms. However, in the presence of a regulatory safety net
that mitigates the effects of bank failure on the financial system, banks may increase leverage
further. Berger et al. (1995) document that the leverage of banks has increased since the
nineteenth century. Equity to asset ratios were about 1:1 in 1840. Leverage then increased to
about 14:1 at the end of the twentieth century. Moreover, the increases in leverage documented
by Berger et al. (1995) coincide with regulatory initiatives that “widened” the safety net for
banks. Poole (2009) and Admati et al. (2013b) show that subsidized debt is distortive.
The literature on creditor monitoring highlights the special role of banks in society as
financial intermediaries. This literature favors higher capital levels than observed currently or
in the recent past. However, it also acknowledges the limits of high solvency levels. More
capital may “crowd out” creditors and depositors, which diminishes their role of monitoring
bank managers. Increased capital levels may therefore lower the threat and prospect of a
bank run. This may lower managerial effort levels, or it may lower managers’ commitment
to collect cash flows from debtors (Diamond and Rajan 2001). The intuition of Diamond and
Rajan is akin to that of Jensen (1986) on the agency cost of free cash flows. Both studies
present a case for low to moderate levels of capital.
Another paper that relies on monitoring by creditors is that by Kashyap et al. (2008), who
advance the idea of capital buffers that vary with the business cycle. In good times, the capital
requirement should be set at a relatively high level such as 10%. In a crisis, this requirement
should be lowered to 8%. This idea is now part of the Basel III capital rules, which introduce
a conservation buffer and the countercyclical buffer. The former can be drawn down when
a bank’s common equity Tier 1 ratio drops below 7%. The latter will be deployed in times
of excess aggregate credit growth (BCBS 2010, sections 3 and 4). Whether these buffers
will work remains to be seen. The capital requirements in good times may be set too high
for monitoring purposes, and the low capital requirements in a crisis may be set too low to
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deter managerial risk taking (Acharya et al. 2010). DeAngelo and Stulz (2013) show that high
leverage levels support the production of liquidity.
Convertible capital also offers a solution to the high cost of equity capital. Convertible se-
curities (contingent convertibles, or CoCos) boost the capital levels only when needed. Flan-
nery (2005), French et al. (2010), Herring and Calomiris (2011), and Pennacchi et al. (2011)
present various CoCo alternatives. These instruments are likely to become more popular as
Basel III rules for debt capital securities require them to be converted into equity when a
bank’s solvency becomes too low, i.e., at the point of nonviability (BCBS 2010, 2011).
However attractive convertible securities may appear, the ones that were issued prior to the
global financial crisis failed to absorb losses (ASIC 2013). Moreover, in practice, CoCos have
many known practical problems that affect their effectiveness (Kimball 2013).
Admati et al. (2013a) argue that the global financial crisis has demonstrated the limits of
creditor monitoring. Creditors might not monitor because they feel protected by, for example,
depositor insurance. Moreover, banks might choose to not impose losses on subordinated debt
holders, to protect future access to the market of subordinated debt.
Admati et al. (2013a) therefore highlight the benefits of high levels of capital, even if they
may require the regulator to devise policies that force banks to issue shares as banks resist
voluntary issuances of shares. Empirical papers supporting Admati et al. (2013a) include that
by Mehran and Thakor (2011), who show that bank value increases with capital and thus
respond to Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Miller (1995), who cling to capital structure
irrelevance. Berger and Bouwman (2013) show that banks’ odds of surviving a crisis increase
with capital.
In a follow-up paper relevant to the present study, Admati et al. (2013b) model the re-
sistance to deleveraging once debt is in place. Although low leverage levels may be optimal
for society, firms with debt will privately resist deleveraging. This is because the benefits of
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deleveraging accrue predominantly to the debt holders. This is particularly the case for banks,
given their high leverage.
The intuition behind Admati et al. (2013b) follows that of the Myers (1977) debt overhang
problem: A highly leveraged firm may forgo a profitable project because its cash flows will
accrue to the debt holders. Admati et al. (2013b) show that highly leveraged firms—banks—
will resist repaying debt for the same reason. The difference is that the Myers debt overhang
problem may prompt a manager to gamble his way out of a debt, with some probability of
success. However, Admati et al. (2013b) show that the resistance to paying off debt persists
however high the benefits of deleveraging are.
To the best of my knowledge, no empirical studies thus far have examined adjustments
applied to Tier 1 (going concern) capital only. Although pre-Basel Accord studies have in-
vestigated items that now belong to Tier 1 capital, these papers report inconsistent results and
do not model the decreasing relationship between regulatory adjustments and solvency that I
document. Nor do these papers examine regulatory adjustments collectively–the papers pre-
dominantly examine levels of capital and the management thereof. For example, in a study
of commercial banks, Beatty et al. (1995) used a simultaneous equation approach applied to
factors that banks may use to manage tax, regulatory capital, and earnings. They found in-
consistent results regarding capital management. Collins et al. (1995), using data around the
implementation of the first Basel Accord, found similar inconsistent evidence regarding cap-
ital management. Moyer (1990), in a study on loan losses, charge-offs, and gains and losses
on securities over the years 1981–1983, found inconsistent, and in some cases insignificant,
results regarding the use of adjustments applied to regulatory capital.
1.2 Regulation
Regulatory capital requirements
Regulation Y of the Federal Reserve System (12 CFR 225 2012) describes the relevant
elements of the definition of capital for US banks. The Federal Reserve System defines capital
to determine three ratios of bank solvency: the Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio, the Tier 1
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leverage ratio, and the total risk-based capital ratio. The risk-based ratios use risk-weighted
assets as the denominator. This is to exempt banks from holding capital against low-risk or
risk-free holdings of assets.1
The Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio is the ratio of Tier 1 capital over total risk-weighted
assets. As an indication of the impact of risk weights, the value of risk-weighted assets is on
average about 70% of the value of total assets.
The Tier 1 leverage ratio is the ratio of Tier 1 capital over average total assets for leverage
capital purposes.
The total risk-based capital ratio is the sum of Tier 1 capital (or core capital) and Tier 2
capital (or supplementary capital), both divided by risk-weighted assets.
For a bank to be called adequately capitalized, the total risk-based capital ratio must equal
or exceed 8% of risk-weighted assets, and the leverage ratio should be higher than 4%. Given
that average total assets are larger than risk-weighted assets, the Tier 1 leverage ratio will reach
4% before the Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio does. Therefore, as an exception to the 4% lever-
age ratio requirement, strong banks may hold 3% of Tier 1 capital against assets (12 CFR 6.4
2011, 12 CFR 225 2012).
Regulatory adjustments
The starting point for the calculation of Tier 1 capital is book equity, that is, common
stockholders’ equity or total bank holding-company equity capital. For prudential reasons,
bank supervisors then adjust book equity to determine regulatory capital. The predominant
prudential criterion for including items in regulatory capital is the ability of an item to ab-
sorb losses before debt holders’ claims (Lautenschla¨ger 2013). Figure 1 shows how these
adjustments were made, line by line, for Bank of America Corporation on June 30, 2013.
1With Basel III being phased in from 2014–2015 onward, this discussion on regulation does not necessarily
reflect the full Basel III implementation. It does cover the measurement period (2001–2013) because the sample
cutoff date is June 30, 2013. This is two days before the Federal Reserve announced the Final Rule on Basel III
implementation (www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20130702a.htm).
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[Figure 1 about here]
The result of these adjustments is a Tier 1 capital figure that differs from book equity, or
equity as defined by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). In the case of Bank
of America Corporation on June 30, 2013, the adjustments created a $74 billion difference
between regulatory Tier 1 capital ($157 billion) and book equity ($231 billion). Without the
adjustments, the Tier 1 leverage ratio would be 11.04%, which is 355 bp higher than the
reported 7.49%.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2005) explains why it diverges from
GAAP. In doing so, the Board justifies the use of regulatory adjustments by indicating that the
adjustments ensure the safety and soundness of the banking system:
Although GAAP informs the definition of regulatory capital, the Board is not
bound to use GAAP accounting concepts in its definition of Tier 1 or Tier 2 cap-
ital because regulatory capital requirements are regulatory constructs designed to
ensure the safety and soundness of banking organizations, not accounting designa-
tions established to ensure the transparency of financial statements. In this regard,
the definition of Tier 1 capital since the Board adopted its risk-based capital rule
in 1989 has differed from GAAP equity in a number of ways. The Board has de-
termined that these differences are consistent with its responsibility for ensuring
the soundness of the capital bases of banking organizations under its supervision.
These differences are not differences between regulatory reporting and GAAP ac-
counting requirements, but rather are differences only between the definition of
equity for purposes of GAAP and the definition of Tier 1 capital for purposes of
the Board’s regulatory capital requirements for banking organizations.
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The Board expressed this rationale in a decision to allow the continued inclusion of out-
standing and prospective issuances of trust-preferred securities in the Tier 1 capital of bank
holding companies.2
Although regulations often refer to the regulatory adjustments as “deductions” or “deduc-
tions from capital” (see, for example, the Basel II framework, BCBS 2006), the rationale of
the Federal Reserve Board shows that it does not discriminate between regulatory adjustments
with different signs. Positive adjustments are deemed to contribute to the safety and soundness
of the banking system because they are intended to absorb losses. Deducted are items that do
not absorb losses, and banks should replenish them with loss-absorbing capital.
Loss absorption is an important prudential criterion governing decisions on regulatory
adjustments. However, it is not the only criterion. The following section shows that political
considerations also play a role in decisions on regulatory adjustments.
1.3 Description of Regulatory Adjustments
Table 1 shows the regulatory adjustments separately, including their average effect on the
Tier 1 capital, expressed in basis points of average total assets. The first column shows the
names of the deductions as reported by banks to the Federal Reserve System on the quarterly
Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (FR Y-9C). The second col-
umn shows the period during which the regulatory adjustments were in force. The third col-
umn, using total bank holding-company equity capital as a reference, reports the direction
of the effect of the adjustments on regulatory capital: “Additions” increase and “Deductions”
decrease Tier 1 capital relative to book equity. A “symmetric” adjustment either adds to or
deducts from Tier 1 capital. “Neutralized” means that the adjustment renders a fair-valued
item to its amortized (accounting) cost value.
2Apparently, at that time, there was insufficient evidence to diverge further from GAAP and exclude these
securities from regulatory capital. However, on July 2, 2013, following the Collins Amendment to the Dodd–
Frank bill, the Federal Reserve Board approved the final rule to help banks to maintain strong capital positions.
This rule now excludes these securities from Tier 1 capital (Collins 2010, Congress of the United States of
America 2010, OCC 2013).
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[Table 1 about here]
The table reports two value columns: one for observations including those where a bank
reports a zero for an item, and the second for nonzero observations only. The values are
expressed in bp of average total assets.
The next section discusses the most significant regulatory adjustments, roughly in order of
their effect on Tier 1 capital.
Note that the text that follows may, in some instances, refer to Basel III. A consultation
version of the new rules on capital was published in 2009 setting expectations on new capital
requirements and allowing banks to pre-emptively adjust their regulatory capital levels (BCBS
2009, 2013a).
Tier 1 hybrid securities
Four items in report FR Y-9C refer to hybrid securities, that is, debt-like securities that may
or may not count toward regulatory bank capital. These are nonqualifying perpetual preferred
stock, which is deducted; qualifying trust-preferred securities, which is an addition; qualifying
restricted core capital elements (other than cumulative perpetual preferred stock), which is
also an addition; and some designated convertible securities, that is, qualifying mandatory
convertible preferred securities of internationally active bank holding companies.
These adjustments refer to hybrid securities, sometimes called “innovative instruments,”
which should be able to absorb losses in going concern (BCBS 1998). Although loss absorp-
tion is an important feature of Tier 1 capital securities, few Tier 1 hybrid securities actually
absorbed losses during the recent global financial crisis (BCBS 2009, ASIC 2013). For that
reason, Basel III has become more restrictive on hybrid securities. For inclusion in Tier 1,
these should now be more equity-like and absorb losses before the bank approaches nonvia-
bility (BCBS 2011). The Federal Reserve System follows Basel III and will ban most, but not
all, hybrid securities from Tier 1 (see footnote 2).
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The effect of the hybrid securities on Tier 1 capital varies. For example, nonqualifying
perpetual preferred stock on average does not affect Tier 1 capital; however, for banks that
have issued such stocks, they lower Tier 1 capital by 71 bp of average total assets.
The securities that are eligible for inclusion in Tier 1 capital augment it by on average 96 bp
(qualifying trust-preferred securities) and 92 bp (qualifying restricted core capital elements
(other than cumulative perpetual preferred stock)). Note that the contributions to Tier 1 capital
are stronger if we restrict the sample to only those banks that issue them: 176 bp and 150 bp,
respectively.
The average effect of qualifying mandatory convertible preferred securities of interna-
tionally active bank holding companies is nil. However, again, for the issuing banks, these
contribute 118 bp to Tier 1 capital.
Goodwill, intangibles, and servicing rights
The item disallowed goodwill and other disallowed intangible assets is the most significant
deduction in terms of its effect on solvency. On average, this deduction decreases Tier 1 capital
by 72 bp, and by 104 bp if we restrict the observations to only nonzero values. This deduction
is commonly required by many countries. It reflects the notion that the amount the bank paid
for goodwill at an acquisition may not be recoverable. This is particularly the case when a
bank is barely viable.
The adjustment for disallowed servicing assets and purchased credit card relationships is
akin to the deduction of goodwill and intangible assets.
Minority interests
Minority interests increase Tier 1 capital. Since Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) Statement No. 160, minority interests should be classified as equity (Leone 2007,
FASB 2008). For the relevant quarters, the adjustment contributes on average 22 bp to Tier 1
capital, and 114 bp if we include only nonzero observations from the sample.
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There are disagreements about whether a minority is a liability or equity, and this split in
views may explain why Basel III rules allow the inclusion of minority interests in common
equity Tier 1 capital, albeit under strict conditions (BCBS 2010, annex 3).
Unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale securities
The next two items—net unrealized losses on available-for-sale equity securities and net
unrealized gains (losses) on available-for-sale securities—undo the fair valuing of securities
held for sale, with the exception of unrealized losses on equity securities held for sale. The
adjustments exclude unrealized fair value gains and losses on debt securities such as bonds
and loans. However, for equity securities, e.g., shares held in other firms, only the unrealized
gains will be excluded.
Although small in comparison to the adjustments for goodwill or hybrid securities, the
exclusion of unrealized gains and losses from regulatory capital is nevertheless controversial.
Banks dislike the inclusion of unrealized gains and losses in regulatory capital, because it
introduces a downside risk element into capital. Furthermore, fair values of assets are believed
to increase the volatility of important ratios (Adrian and Shin 2010, Becker 2013).
Bank regulators disagree about the treatment of unrealized gains and losses in regulatory
capital, and the rules governing this adjustment may change. The Appendix details the con-
troversy regarding the inclusion of unrealized gains and losses in regulatory capital.
Deferred tax assets
Deferred tax assets are a negative adjustment that constitutes about 5 bp of the Tier 1
leverage ratio. From a prudential point of view, it makes sense to exclude deferred tax assets
from regulatory capital. Loss-making banks report this deferred asset, which can be used
to generate tax relief only if at some time in the future the bank holding company returns to
profitability.
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Cumulative results of own creditworthiness
The exclusion of cumulative results of own creditworthiness undoes the fair valuing of
liabilities accounted for under the fair value option. The United States introduced this ad-
justment in 2007 (FFIEC 2007). It effectively levels the playing field with Europe, where
treatment of own credit results of creditworthiness sparked controversy at the introduction of
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Barth et al. 2008). Initially, this led to a
“carve-out” of the fair value option from European IFRS. However, shortly after IFRS came
into force in Europe, and after close coordination between the European Commission, the In-
ternational Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and the Basel Committee, the carve-out was
eliminated from IFRS (EC 2005). Despite this elimination, regulators including the Federal
Reserve continued it for banks.
The adjustment is symmetrical. In the case of gains, the adjustment acknowledges the
compensation that banks will need to offer subordinated debt holders to redeem their debt.
This strengthens the case for this adjustment.
To illustrate this point, at the time of the European Banking Authority stress test of 2011,
BNP Paribas bought back part of a £350 million security at a price significantly below par,
at 72.50% (£253.75 million), but £23.75 million over the market price just before purchase
(£230.00 million, or 65.75%). In doing so, BNP paid a premium of £23.75 million to crys-
tallize a gain on own creditworthiness, which was intended to strengthen equity by £96.25
million (BNP Paribas 2011a,b). The premiums paid compensate subordinated debt holders
for their contribution to making other debt less risky; i.e., these premiums are unavoidable and
demonstrate that the fair value gains on own creditworthiness are fickle. This justifies their
exclusion from capital.
Other deductions
The symmetrical adjustment for accumulated net gains (losses) on cash flow hedges is an
accrual that leads to cash outflows later and, therefore, should not be included in regulatory
capital. The adjustment for amounts recorded in accumulated other comprehensive income
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resulting from the initial and subsequent application of FASB ASC 715-20 (former FASB State-
ment No. 158) to defined benefit postretirement plans follows the logic of the adjustment for
net unrealized gains (losses) on available-for-sale securities. However, the amounts involved
are generally small.
2. BASIS FOR PREDICTION, SAMPLE, AND RESEARCH DESIGN
2.1 Basis for Prediction
The cost of regulatory capital for banks may be high because of subsidized debt and in-
creased agency costs (Diamond and Rajan 2001, Poole 2009). These factors motivate banks
to increase leverage to maximize firm value (Modigliani and Miller 1958, 1963, Miller 1995).
Furthermore, regulatory capital in the form of common equity is relatively expensive. It
counts toward regulatory capital jointly with hybrid capital securities. These securities are
low-cost substitutes for common equity because of tax deductible coupons or coupons that are
capped.3
The ability to substitute hybrid capital securities for equity has value, particularly when
equity is expensive. The value of regulatory adjustments should thus reflect the cost of equity
capital.
To model the value of regulatory adjustments, I rely on Merton (1974), who shows that the
value of equity can be expressed as
E = A ·N(d1)−Ke−rtN(d2), (1)
3Capped are variable coupon payments that will not exceed a prespecified percentage.
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where A represents the asset value of the bank, K is the book value of debt, r is the risk-free
rate, and t is the duration of debt. N(d) is the probability that a standard normal random
variable will be less than or equal to d:
d1 =
ln( AK )+(r+σ
2/2)t
σ
√
t
d2 = d1−σ
√
t.
(2)
Equation (1) shows that a dollar reduction in debt (K) increases the value of equity (E) by less
than one dollar. The increase in the value of equity is between zero and, at best, the value of
the bond price:
0 < −∂E
∂K
< e−rt . (3)
The equity holder will always lose the time value of money, because he redeems debt now
instead of later. This explains the upper bound in equation (3) (Smith 1976). However, the
equity holder also forfeits the option value of equity, which is most valuable at low solvency
levels. According to Admati et al. (2013b), the equity holder loses most of the benefits of
deleveraging to the debt holders. Thus, deleveraging is undesirable from the perspective of
the equity holder.
Based on equation (1), the cost of deleveraging decreases with solvency. The cost of
deleveraging (C), here defined as the amount paid to debt holders (∂K) but not reflected in an
increase of equity (∂E), is
C = 1+
∂E
∂K
C = 1− e−rtN(d2),
(4)
where ∂E∂K is the partial derivative of the value of equity with respect to debt. Equation (4)
shows that the cost of deleveraging increases with leverage (KA ).
The cost of deleveraging approaches a floor at 1− e−rt if the bank has close to zero debt.
At that point, the relevant costs reflect the opportunity costs of expediting the debt redemption.
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Based on equation (4), the relationship between the cost of deleveraging and solvency
is convex: high at low levels of solvency, declining with solvency, and approaching a lower
bound when solvency is at its maximum, as shown in Figure 2.
[Figure 2 about here]
The vertical axis in the figure shows the cost of deleveraging per dollar redeemed. The
horizontal axis represents solvency. At the far right, there is no debt; at the far left, there is no
equity.4 The figure shows that the cost of deleveraging approaches a hyperbola for solvency
levels that are moderate to very low.
I expect that banks respond to the cost of deleveraging by managing regulatory adjust-
ments. For example, in a setting without regulatory adjustments, the introduction of a rule that
requires a bank to deduct one dollar of capital from equity forces that bank to replenish the
deducted dollar. It can do so by issuing shares or by deleveraging, which the bank will attempt
to avoid (Admati et al. 2013b).
If the regulator notices that banks collectively avoid replenishing deducted capital, it may
respond with policy initiatives that allow banks to issue less costly capital substitutes.
In the presence of a menu of regulatory choices, banks will manage the structure of regu-
latory capital. They will replenish deducted capital with nonequity substitutes, avoid activities
that give rise to deductions, or simply issue nonequity capital securities to augment regulatory
capital. The cost of deleveraging thus determines the value of regulatory adjustments:
D = f (C), (5)
where D represents the dollar value of regulatory adjustments.
4The figure assumes the following parameter values: t = 2.5 years—assuming average maturity of a 5-year
Tier 2 hybrid capital security; risk-free rate r = 4.0%; annual standard deviation σ= 20.0%.
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Bearing in mind Figure 2 and equation (4), I predict that low-solvency banks will manage
capital relatively aggressively: They will issue significant amounts of equity substitutes while
avoiding deductions. Likewise, I predict that banks with high solvency will manage regulatory
adjustments less aggressively.
2.2 Research Design
I use the reciprocal of the equity solvency ratio to estimate the relationship between regu-
latory adjustments and solvency:
∆ = g(1S), (6)
where ∆ is the dollar value of regulatory adjustments (D) standardized for total assets. More
specifically: ∆ is the difference between regulatory Tier 1 capital (T ) and book equity (E),
both divided by total assets:
∆ =
T −E
A
. (7)
Equation (6) shows that ∆ is a function of 1S , where
1
S is the reciprocal of the solvency of a
bank, here defined as total assets over equity: 1S =
A
E . Additionally, equation (6) expresses
the value of regulatory adjustments as a function of solvency in such a way that the positive
effect of regulatory adjustments on regulatory capital diminishes as solvency increases. The
relationship is assumed to be convex and hyperbolic.
It is not likely that extremely low denominators in 1S will comprise my analysis; my analy-
sis pertains to banks that are not critically undercapitalized. These banks have a ratio of equity
to total assets of more than 2% (EA > 0.02) (12 CFR 6.4 2011).
Univariate regressions
The univariate regression analyses rely on the following model, with ∆i,t as a measure of
regulatory adjustments:
∆i,t = β0 +β1 1Si,t + εi,t , (8)
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where the reciprocal of solvency (Si,t) is 1Si,t =
Ai,t
Ei,t
: the average total assets [3368] standardized
by total bank holding-company equity capital [3210].5
The regression model relies on p-values that account for the two dimensions (banks (i) and
quarters (t)) of within-cluster correlation (Petersen 2009).
Note that the functional form of the model follows from Section 2.1. It should be preferred
over a quadratic function or a form that relies on the negative of the log of S. The former is
inconsistent with my prediction. It violates the requirement that the option value of equity
approaches a lower bound of 1− e−rt with increasing solvency. The latter also violates this
requirement, because the log function has no bounds. Nevertheless, Section 4 (robustness
tests) shows that a log function overestimates the effect of deductions, in particular for banks
that are highly solvent.
I expect that low-solvency banks will value regulatory adjustments higher than high-
solvency banks. This would lead to a positive slope coefficient (β1), which is generally offset
by a negative coefficient for the intercept (β0).
I apply three measures of regulatory adjustments (∆) to assess my expectations. The first
measure, Tier 1 minus equity, is the difference between Tier 1 capital [8274] and equity (total
bank holding-company equity capital [3210]) from report FR Y-9C; both standardized for
average total assets [3368]. This measure is straightforward to interpret: Positive adjustment
values applied to equity increase Tier 1 capital, whereas negative adjustments applied to equity
decrease Tier 1 capital.
I choose this aggregate approach instead of a piecemeal approach to each single adjust-
ment for three reasons. (i) The information pertains to the holding company of a bank group.
Because of the consolidated nature of the information, the regulatory adjustments are likely to
be managed jointly by management of the holding company. (ii) The consolidated nature of
5Codes in square brackets are the item codes from the Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding
Companies (FR Y-9C); their definitions are from www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/mdrm/DataDictionary/
Search.cfm.
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the reported information dovetails with US bank supervision, which primarily relies on con-
solidated information instead of on information from individual subsidiaries (Bhatia 2011).
(iii) Regulators often discuss the adjustments jointly; see the sections defining regulatory cap-
ital and adjustments in Regulation Y, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) and
Federal Reserve’s Supervision Manuals, and Basel II and Basel III (BCBS 2006, 2010, FDIC
2012, 12 CFR 225 2012, Federal Reserve 2013).
The second measure of adjustment separately records positive adjustments and negative
adjustments. This second measure differs from the first in that banks may manage additions
differently from deductions.
Note, however, that some items contain positive as well as negative values. For example,
item [8434] records both the unrealized gains and the unrealized losses on available-for-sale
securities. Unrealized gains are deducted from Tier 1 capital, and unrealized losses are added
back to Tier 1 capital; however, a bank holding company can report only the net positive or a
negative value for that particular item.
This second measure acknowledges the different signs of these values: It codes adjust-
ments for unrealized gains as deductions from capital. The adjustment for unrealized losses
is coded as an addition to capital. I group the deductions and additions into two distinct vari-
ables: one that comprises only the deductions, and one that comprises only the additions to
the Tier 1 leverage ratio.
My third measure of regulatory adjustments is the item net unrealized gains (losses) on
available-for-sale securities [8434]. I use this adjustment because it is a symmetrical ad-
justment to capital; adjustments can be both positive and negative. The symmetrical property
allows me to generalize the results for any adjustment, not only to those that are either positive
or negative. Furthermore, I use this adjustment because it persistently attracts attention from
banks, regulators, and standard setters. Results for this measure may therefore contribute to
the ongoing policy debate on the inclusion in regulatory capital of unrealized gains and losses
on available-for-sale securities.
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Multivariate regressions
The following model expands on the previous model with control variables. Except for
credit growth (Credit) and Size, all variables are standardized by the average total assets of a
bank:
∆ = β0 +β1 1S +β2Risk+β3Size+β4Tier 2 LLA+β5Funding gap
+β6ROA+β7Liquid assets+β8Credit +β9I2006 ·Credit
+β10I2007−2013 ·Credit +
12
∑
j=2
β j+9District j + ε.
(9)
I assume that subscripts for firms (i) and quarters (t) are understood.
The regression model relies on p-values that account for the two dimensions (banks and
quarters) of within-cluster correlation (Petersen 2009).
Risk is risk-weighted assets over total assets: ([A223] over [2170]). Size is the natural
log of one dollar plus the value of total assets [2710] in thousands of dollars. Tier 2 LLA is
allowance for loan and lease losses includible in Tier 2 capital [5310].
Funding gap is the difference between loans and deposits, where the former is loans and
leases net of unearned income and allowance [B529] and [2125] and loans and leases held
for sale [5369]; and the latter is the sum of interest-bearing and noninterest-bearing deposits
[6631] and [6636]. ROA is Return on Assets: income (loss) before income taxes and extraor-
dinary items, and other adjustments [4301] over total assets [2710]. Liquid assets is cash and
balances due from depository institutions [0010].
Credit is a measure for the business cycle. It is the aggregate change in the value of loans
of all sample banks relative to the value of total assets of the sample banks. The change
is measured over the period of a year (four quarters). Note that the change in supervisory
threshold for submitting the FR Y-9C reports requires the use of an indicator variable for
observations of 2006 as well as one for the years after 2006. District is an indicator variable
for the 12 Federal Reserve Districts, where coefficient values are relative to the first district:
Boston.
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I use control variables as follows. Size may in itself be an inverse measure of risk (Banz
1981, Fama and French 1992). However, for financial intermediaries, size may also be seen
as a determinant of failure, which is in line with Bhagat et al. (2012), who show that size is
a prime driver of risk. Given the ambiguity regarding the effects of size and risk, I separately
control for each of these two factors.
Risky banks may need additional capital to absorb losses. This can be done, for example,
by issuing hybrid instruments. In addition, risky banks may want to avoid relying on items
that do not absorb losses; they therefore may avoid deductions in order to augment capital. I
therefore expect a positive coefficient on risk.
Size may affect the use of regulatory adjustments in different ways. For example, larger
banks have relatively unproblematic access to investors. They may want to increase capital by
issuing relatively inexpensive hybrid securities. The coefficient on size may thus be affected
positively by size through additions to Tier 1 capital. Smaller banks may be less complex, and
thus may make less use of adjustments.
Tier 2 LLA is negatively related to the bank’s probability of continuing as a going concern
via the total risk-based capital ratio and, therefore, is expected to be positively associated
with the use of capital-increasing adjustments (Ng and Roychowdhury 2011). Conversely, the
allowance for loan and lease losses may coincide with incurred losses, which gives rise to
deferred tax assets, which are deducted from Tier 1 capital.
Funding gap is expected to increase the internally determined demand for capital require-
ments, for example, via the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process. Banks with a
relatively high funding gap will need to resort to more expensive forms of funding such as
capital in the form of hybrid securities. The reliance on nondepositors gives banks an incen-
tive to lower the cost of bankruptcy protection by increasing regulatory capital—where banks
prefer issuing inexpensive subordinated debt over equity (Myers and Majluf 1984, Berger
1995). Therefore, I expect a positive relationship between the funding gap and regulatory
adjustments.
22
ROA is a measure of operating performance, which may be positively associated with
intangible assets (including goodwill and servicing rights) and negatively associated with de-
ferred tax assets. Furthermore, with stronger investor appetite to invest in subordinated hybrid
securities of more profitable firms, ROA may be associated with the use of capital-increasing
adjustments. Additionally, Berger (1995) and Berger and Bouwman (2013), the latter against
a backdrop of mixed evidence on the relationship between capital and performance, document
a positive relationship between these two variables.
The relationship between liquid assets and deductions may be mechanical. Banks that
crystallize unrealized gains by selling available-for-sale securities may hold more cash and
therefore may have less to deduct. This implies a positive relationship between liquidity and
the expected coefficient on deductions. The effect of liquidity on additions, however, is less
clear cut. It may be that higher liquidity is a manifestation of slack, in which case the relation-
ship would be negative (Jensen 1986). However, liquidity is also a sign of resilience; see the
liquidity requirements in Basel III (BCBS 2010). This may positively affect investor appetite
to invest in hybrid securities.
Credit growth is a measure of the business cycle. I use this control because of the debate
about the effects of capital requirements on economic growth (Admati et al. 2013a, DeAngelo
and Stulz 2013) and because of research that documents an association between growth and
regulatory capital (Laeven and Majnoni 2003).
To control for differences in supervision approaches regarding regulatory adjustments, I
employ indicator variables for Federal Reserve Regulatory Districts 2–12.6
2.3 Sample Selection
I use quarterly data from US bank holding companies submitted on report FR Y-9C to the
Federal Reserve System. I include only those entities with a Bank Holding Company charter,
i.e., where item [9331] has value 28 and item [9048] has value 500.
6For the designations of districts, see www.federalreserve.gov/otherfrb.htm.
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The starting point of the sample is 2001, because of the availability of data for the variables
of interest. Furthermore, from 2001 onward, the reporting schedule for regulatory capital on
FR Y-9C retained its current structure with only minor changes to the items included. The
sample includes observations of banks up to and including June 30, 2013.
I exclude observations from banks with year-ends other than December 31. To control for
outliers, observations in the highest and lowest percentile of variables affected are eliminated
from the sample.
The main sample contains 62,756 quarterly observations, with the number of banks vary-
ing from 2,096 in 2005 to 773 in 2007. The primary cause of the drop in the number of
banks after 2005 is a change in the filing requirements for bank holding companies: In 2006,
the threshold for filing a FR Y-9C report changed from $150 million of total assets to $500
million of total assets (Federal Reserve 2006).
3. RESULTS
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Tables 2 and 3 present the sample descriptives. All figures are from US bank holding
companies reported on FR Y-9C. Table 2 presents descriptives over time. Table 3 presents
pooled sample descriptives of the main variables used in the regression analyses.
Descriptives over time
Table 2 shows information for the fiscal year-ends of 2001–2012 and the second quarter
of 2013. Except for the obvious items and those that are preceded by “Total” (which are
expressed in millions of dollars), all items are standardized by average total assets.
[Table 2 and Table 3 about here]
The solvency ratios (equity, Tier 1 capital, and total risk-based capital) all increase over
time. Equity solvency increases by 90 bp from 8.92% to 9.82%, with a fairly steep increase
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after 2008. This may indicate an anticipation of regulators’ efforts to increase regulatory
capital ratios. Likewise, Tier 1 over average total assets increases from 8.63% to 9.79%.
The first measure of adjustment (Tier 1 minus equity) peaks in 2005. For 2001–2003, 2007,
and from 2011 onward, the adjustments are negative, acting as deductions—thus depressing
the Tier 1 leverage ratio.
Regulatory capital, or total risk-based capital, drops to a low of 12.73% in 2008 because
of the global financial crisis. However, from then onward, it increases steadily.
The variables that reflect size (total equity and total assets) increase over the sample pe-
riod. The increase in these values after 2005 reflects the change in the filing threshold for
report FR Y-9C in 2006. This change in the filing threshold warrants further investigation (see
Section 4).
ROA reflects the decreasing performance of bank holding companies in the sample. It
drops from 1.36% to a low of −0.37% in 2009 and thus does not return to precrisis levels.
The observation (0.54%) for 2013 reflects the inclusion of only the first two quarters in the
research sample.
Regarding disallowed goodwill and other disallowed intangible assets, this deduction
peaks in 2007, at the start of the global financial crisis. From then onward, it reverts steadily.
The net unrealized gains (losses) on available-for-sale securities is the amount of net un-
realized gains and losses on available-for-sale securities. This net adjustment peaks in 2005,
reflecting a dominance of unrealized gains for this year. The entry for 2013 is positive, indi-
cating the return of unrealized gains.
“Core Elemts & Trups” are qualifying restricted core capital elements (other than cumula-
tive perpetual preferred stock) and qualifying trust-preferred securities, which are nonaccounting-
based adjustments: They reflect the issuance of Tier 1 eligible hybrid securities. The issuance
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of these securities peaks before the global financial crisis, and then declines, perhaps because
banks anticipate the more stringent Basel III rules for these securities.
The funding gap peaks during the onset of the crisis at values immediately below −6%.
This variable is driven by a drop in the amount of deposits and an increase in the value of
loans—which comprises loans and leases net of unearned income and allowance and loans
and leases held for sale.
Disallowed deferred tax assets show a predictable increase after 2008, and despite an up-
turn in the business cycle, have continued to increase since then.
Descriptives of pooled data
Table 3 shows descriptives of the main regression variables. The information uses data
from all quarters over the period 2001Q1–2013Q2. It shows that regulatory adjustments gen-
erally depress book equity. My main variable of interest, Tier 1 minus equity, has a mean
(median) value of −5 bp (−11 bp) over average total assets. These values are close to zero
and relatively small compared with the range, which is −443 bp to 311 bp.
The distributions of the aggregated additions and aggregated deductions are similar: Their
means are 79 bp and−85 bp, respectively; the maximum of additions is 569 bp, and the largest
deduction is 589 bp.
The next two rows of Table 3 confirm that the distribution of equity solvency is less lep-
tokurtic than the distribution of Tier 1 capital solvency. The medians of both solvency mea-
sures are similar (9.03% and 8.98%). However, the values at percentiles 5 and 25 of Tier 1
capital are higher than equity. Likewise, the values of Tier 1 capital at percentiles 75 and 95
are below equity.
Both measures of solvency range from about 2% to about 20%—the range over which
equation (6) would reflect the hyperbolic relationship between regulatory adjustments and
bank solvency.
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According to the solvency benchmarks of 12 CFR 225 (2012), the sample contains no
banks that are critically undercapitalized, e.g., values of book equity over total assets are more
than 2%. The maximum value of the reciprocal of solvency (1S ) is 43.1.
The next row shows the net sum of adjustments. This net sum is the sum of the use of
regulatory adjustments mentioned in Table 1: Each positive adjustment increases the net sum
by 1, and each negative adjustment decreases the net sum. On average banks rely on one (net)
deduction.
The distribution for net unrealized gains (losses) on available-for-sale securities spans a
range between −470 bp and 389 bp. This is wider than an interquartile range of 28 bp, thus
indicating that this item may be important for a limited set of banks.
The size distribution shows a strong increase in size in the top 5 percentile, which indicates
that the market structure of banks is biased toward a limited number of very large banks. This
justifies the use of variables standardized for average total assets.
Risk, measured as risk-weighted assets over total assets, has an average and median value
of 0.72, with 90% of the observations ranging between 0.52 and 0.89.
Although the time series of ROA are relatively stable, the pooled information ranges from
−15.7% to 8.43%.
The variables liquid assets and credit growth are 4.96 and 2.57 (means), respectively, with
a maximum of 61.27 for liquid assets, and a minimum of −21.3 for credit growth.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the distribution of both solvency measures. Figure 3 plots the
distribution of Tier 1 capital and book equity. Both variables are divided by total assets. The
distributions therefore illustrate solvency ratios using two different numerators: book equity
and Tier 1 capital.
Figure 4 plots the effect of regulatory adjustments for deciles of solvency. The solid circles
show the effect of the aggregate regulatory adjustments on Tier 1 capital, expressed in basis
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points of total assets. The triangles (diamonds) show the effect of regulatory adjustments that
increase (decrease) Tier 1 capital relative to book equity.
[Figures 3 and 4 about here]
If the adjustments were only deductions, then the Tier 1 distribution would be a copy of
the distribution of equity, but shifted to the left. Likewise, if adjustments were only additions,
then the Tier 1 distribution would be shifted to the right of the distribution of equity. Instead,
the distribution of Tier 1 capital is more leptokurtic than the distribution of equity. Figure 4
shows why: Positive (negative) adjustments are to be found at banks with low (high) solvency
ratios.
3.2 Results of Tier 1 Minus Equity
Figure 5 summarizes the main results. The graphs use the coefficient estimates of the uni-
variate regressions for four measures of adjustments. The first is the difference between Tier 1
capital and total bank holding-company equity capital—standardized for average total assets
(Tier 1 minus equity). The second graph only tracks additions to equity, and the third graph
only tracks deductions from equity. The fourth graph tracks the effects of the adjustments for
unrealized gains and losses.
In the following, I discuss each of these regulatory adjustments.
[Figure 5 about here]
Table 4 presents the regression results, using the first measure of adjustments: the differ-
ence between Tier 1 capital and total bank holding-company equity capital, both standardized
for average total assets. The coefficients are all expressed in basis points, i.e., multiplied by
10,000. The p-values account for the two dimensions (banks (i) and quarters (t)) of within-
cluster correlation (Petersen 2009).
[Table 4 about here]
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The univariate regression in Table 4 shows a positive slope coefficient of 16.6 and an
intercept coefficient of −204 bp. As expected, the p-values indicate the significance of both
coefficients.
The coefficient of 16.6 on 1S should be read as follows. At a book equity solvency ratio of
4%, the 16.6 bp should be divided by 4% to calculate the amount of basis points the Tier 1
capital increases relative to average total assets: 404 bp (0.00166/0.04 = 0.0414). At a book
solvency ratio of 5%, the increase is 331 bp, and at 10%, it is 166 bp. These values are
offset by a negative intercept. In the case of the univariate regression of Table 4, the offset is
−204 bp. The value of regulatory adjustments can thus be determined at any level of solvency
in a straightforward way.
The coefficient of variation of 0.24 and the p-value of zero for the F-statistic confirm the
model’s significance and its ability to explain variation in regulatory adjustments.
The multivariate regression model results confirm the univariate results, and the value of
the slope coefficient (16.0) is close to that of the univariate model. Regarding the control
variables, the coefficient on risk is significant and confirms my expectation that riskier banks
rely on regulatory adjustments to augment capital.
The coefficient on size shows that larger banks have more regulatory adjustments that
decrease Tier 1 capital. The next section of this paper examines the underlying drivers of this
coefficient.
The positive sign of the allowance for loan and lease losses includible in Tier 2 capital
indicates, albeit with a p-value of 0.22, that banks that use this allowance report positive
regulatory adjustments.
The coefficient for the funding gap is positive, albeit with a p-value of 0.03. This indicates
that banks may augment Tier 1 capital for funding reasons. This supports the result obtained
by Berger (1995) that banks use elevated levels of capital to substitute funding alternatives for
forgone depositor funding.
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The positive coefficient on ROA indicates that banks that perform well appear to use regu-
latory adjustments to improve Tier 1 capital, although this result is only marginally significant.
Liquid assets are positively associated with regulatory adjustments, thus confirming the
notion that liquid assets can be converted into assets that are subject to deduction rules.
The coefficients on credit growth are insignificant and inconsistent. These results therefore
do not support an association between regulatory capital and the business cycle.
The evidence for a relationship between regulatory adjustments and the Federal Districts
is mixed, and the coefficients are insignificant.
3.3 Results of the Analysis of Additions and Deductions
Table 5 presents the regression results for the second measure of adjustments: adjustments
applied to equity, split between additions and deductions. These are the separately summed
deductions and additions listed in Table 1. Note that the two measures include the amounts
that a symmetric adjustment adds to (deducts from) Tier 1.
[Table 5 about here]
The results of the univariate regressions confirm the results reported in the previous table.
The slope coefficient on 1S is positive and significant for the additions (9.11) and for the de-
ductions (5.43). The intercepts are negative: −30.5 and −150, and both are significant. The
coefficients generate the top and bottom curves of Figure 5.
Both slope coefficient values are lower than the slope coefficient value of that reported in
Table 4. Figure 5 explains why. It shows that the curves for additions and deductions are less
steep than the Tier 1 minus equity curve. The top of the additions curve touches the top of the
Tier 1 minus equity curve. Likewise, the minimum of the deductions curve coincides with the
minimum of the Tier 1 minus equity curve.
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The results of the multivariate regression model confirm the univariate results. The slope
coefficients on 1S drop slightly to 8.42 and 5.42 (from 9.11 and 5.43), remaining positive
and significant, and thus confirming my expectations. The F-statistics confirm the model’s
significance for both univariate models.
The coefficient on risk is positive and significant throughout. This confirms my expectation
that riskier banks augment Tier 1 capital by issuing hybrids and by avoiding deductions.
The positive coefficient on size for additions, with a p-value of 0.00, shows that large
banks can more easily access the market for hybrid instruments. The negative coefficient on
size, for deductions, shows that larger banks have more to deduct. This may be a manifestation
of the fact that larger banks are more complex and consequently engage in more activities that
give rise to deductions.
The significantly positive value of 2,664 on the allowance for loan and lease losses indi-
cates that banks that use the allowance rely on items that increase Tier 1 capital. This is likely
a manifestation of risk. The negative value of −1,324 for deductions appears to indicate that
banks that use the allowance are loss-making and may deduct deferred tax assets. However,
the p-value of 0.18 weakens the support for conclusive inferences.
The coefficient for the funding gap is positive for both additions and deductions, albeit
that the coefficient for the latter is insignificant. To augment Tier 1 capital, banks with a larger
funding gap rely on adding items to Tier 1 capital.
ROA is significant only for the deductions, which indicates that well-performing banks
deduct less. The significantly positive coefficient (576) is mainly the result of noninterest
income: Untabulated results show that net interest income is not significantly associated with
regulatory adjustments. One explanation for the positive and significant coefficient on ROA is
that it indicates the presence of nonbanking activities, which may give rise to less deductions.
Regarding the relationship between liquid assets and deductions, as predicted, the ability to
convert assets subject to deduction requirements into cash drives the positive and significant
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coefficient value of liquid assets. The negative sign of additions may be a manifestation of
slack, thus confirming Jensen (1986).
The credit growth coefficients on deductions are not always significant and have opposite
signs, which indicates that there is no consistent association between the economic cycle and
regulatory adjustments. Comparing this result with that of Laeven and Majnoni (2003)—who
show an association between the allowance for loan and lease losses includible in Tier 2 capital
and the economic cycle—reveals that Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital differ.
The coefficients on the Federal Districts indicate that banks with items that increase Tier 1
capital are concentrated in particular in these districts: Richmond, St. Louis, Minneapolis,
Kansas City, and Dallas. Banks in the district of Minneapolis appear to offset the additions
by significant deductions. The district of Richmond, which hosts large banks based in North
Carolina, appears not to offset additions. This may indicate the influence of large banks on
supervision policy, although this inference should be interpreted with great care.
3.4 Results for Net Unrealized Gains (Losses) on Available-for-Sale Securities
Table 6 presents the regression results for the third measure of adjustments: the net unre-
alized gains (losses) on available-for-sale securities. The results of the univariate regressions
confirm the results reported in the previous tables. Note that the dependent variable (net un-
realized gains (losses) on available-for-sale securities, a deduction) is multiplied by −1 to
maintain consistency between the interpretation of coefficients and the previous tables.
[Table 6 about here]
The slope coefficient on 1S is positive (2.03) and significant, and the intercept is also sig-
nificant: −35.3. Both coefficients produce the graph closest to the horizontal axis of Figure 5.
Here again the relationship between the regulatory adjustments and solvency is apparent, al-
though the magnitude of the effect on the Tier 1 leverage ratio is less profound than that of
the two other measures of regulatory adjustments. This result may put into perspective the
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relevance of the policy debate on the inclusion of unrealized gains and losses. The F-statistic
confirms the model’s significance.
The graph in Figure 5 shows that thinly capitalized banks, i.e., those with very low sol-
vency ratios, benefit from the symmetrical filter of net unrealized gains (losses) on available-
for-sale securities, thus confirming criticism from academics and regulators on this symmetri-
cal filter.
The multivariate analysis confirms the univariate results. Risk remains consistently pos-
itive and significant. The coefficient on the allowance for loan and lease losses includible
in Tier 2 capital is negative and significant as well. Banks that use the allowance for loan
and lease losses apparently also report high levels of unrealized gains. Combined with the
coefficient on risk, these are indications of poor resilience.
4. ROBUSTNESS TESTS
To assess the robustness of the results of this study, I performed additional tests. For
example, I used alternative different model specifications for the main regression model. A
model that uses the negative log of equity over average total assets leads to the same inferences,
with the coefficient equity over average total assets being negative (−236) and significant (p-
value of 0.00), and with a negative intercept (−581) that is also significant (p-value of 0.00).
However, this pair of coefficients overestimates the deductions at higher solvency levels; for
example, at the 20% mark in the graph, the log model would estimate the effect of deductions
at −201 bp, whereas Figure 4 shows a maximum deduction effect of about −100 bp. This
result justifies the use of 1S as the main regressor in my analyses.
A quadratic function leads to the same inferences, that is, for solvency ratios below 20%.
The predicted monotonic decline stops beyond this level of solvency. The upward slope of the
adjustments curve beyond this percentage is difficult to explain: There is no a priori reason to
expect highly solvent banks to deduct less from equity. Although Figure 4 may show a slight
upturn for banks in the rightmost decile, the upturn is in fact less dramatic than appears in
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the figure, because it is driven by a limited number of highly solvent banks. Moreover, the
additions also drop off at high levels of solvency.
Note that the regulatory adjustments are small in comparison with solvency. For example,
the maximum effect of absolute regulatory adjustments is 443 bp of average total assets, with
90% of observations between [−235 bp, 211 bp] of average total assets. This precludes a
potential mechanical explanation.
To illustrate the mechanical explanation, consider two banks, G and L, which have the
same book equity and Tier 1 leverage ratio at t = 0. In period t = 1, G makes a gain, and
L makes a corresponding loss, both of which must be adjusted for to arrive at Tier 1 capital.
When the adjustments are made, they will both have the same Tier 1 capital, but G’s book
equity will be larger than that of bank L. G’s adjustment will be negative, and L’s will be
positive. This will show as a negative relationship between adjustments and book equity
capital: those with smaller equity making positive adjustments and those with larger equity
making negative ones.
I performed two tests to assess this alternative explanation. First, I split the sample into
banks of type G and L, and then into a second split based on above- and below-average sol-
vency. The mechanical explanation should hold for high-solvency type-G banks and low-
solvency type-L banks. However, untabulated results show that the decreasing relationship
between regulatory adjustments and solvency holds for both types of banks irrespective of
solvency.
As a second test, I counted the use of adjustments. This is a relatively robust test, in which
I expected that low-solvency banks would use more capital-increasing adjustments and that
high-solvency banks would be affected by more capital-decreasing adjustments.
[Table 7 about here]
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Table 7 reports the result of this analysis. The table uses as the dependent variable the
net sum of regulatory adjustments employed by a bank. The net sum is the sum of the use
of regulatory adjustments mentioned in Table 1: Each positive adjustment increases the net
sum by 1, and each negative adjustment decreases the net sum. Table 7 reports the results
of regressions in which the net sum excludes symmetric adjustments (the left-hand columns).
The right-hand columns include these adjustments: Positive (negative) symmetric adjustments
increase (decrease) the net sum.
The count data analysis confirms my expectations: The coefficients on 1S are all signif-
icant and positive. All intercepts are significant and negative. Low-solvency banks rely on
additions, and high-solvency banks are affected relatively strongly by deductions. Note that
I repeated the count data analysis with ordered logistic regressions. This led to the same
inferences. The results of both tests preclude a mechanical explanation.
Given that the results rely on panel data, I estimated the relationship between regulatory
adjustments and solvency with bank fixed effects and robust standard errors. The results of
these analyses do not alter the inferences.
I also examined the effect of the 2006 change in the threshold for filing a FR Y-9C report.
Banks may have anticipated this change and, consequently, may have changed the use of
regulatory adjustments. To test this effect, I marked all banks in 2005 that, because of the
change in the threshold, did not file a FR Y-9C report during 2006. The 1,292 banks that were
marked as such are largely similar to the 804 banks that would file in 2006. For example,
equity solvency medians are 8.47% (8.56%) for the filing (nonfiling) banks. Likewise, Tier 1
capital solvency ratios are 8.57% and 9.01%, respectively. Again, equity solvency is less
leptokurtic than the distribution of Tier 1 capital solvency. The 5th (95th) percentile value of
the latter is 88 bp (42 bp) higher (lower) than the former. The median adjustment of filing
(nonfiling) banks augmented Tier 1 capital by 10 bp (12 bp). ROA performance between both
groups is also similar: 1.47% for filing banks, and 1.39% for nonfiling banks. Risk is also
similar: 0.76 and 0.73, respectively. The groups differ in the amounts added to and deducted
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from Tier 1 capital. The median of the additions is 127 bp (21 bp) for the filing (nonfiling)
banks. Likewise, for deductions, these values are −46 bp (−8 bp).
These results indicate that the nonfiling banks share the characteristics of smaller banks:
restricted access to the market for hybrid securities; and lower complexity, resulting in lower
deductions. Otherwise, the characteristics of the two groups of banks are equivalent.
Regression results confirm this inference. The univariate regressions with Tier 1 minus
equity as the dependent variable report significant slope coefficients: 23.9 (16.5) for the filing
(nonfiling) banks. The intercepts are also negative and significant: −276 and −158, respec-
tively.
The results are also independent of being listed or not listed on a stock exchange. Finally,
the results are time invariant—the exponentially declining cost of regulatory adjustments is
not tied to a specific time period.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
For a large sample of US bank holding companies over the period 2001–2013, this paper
documents a decreasing relationship between bank solvency and the adjustments that banks
must apply to book equity to calculate regulatory Tier 1 capital.
These regulatory adjustments create a difference between regulatory Tier 1 and “account-
ing capital” or book equity. The adjustments alter both the structure and the level of regulatory
capital. The difference between book equity and Tier 1 capital may be substantial. Relative
to book equity, the regulatory adjustments increase (decrease) Tier 1 capital up to 311 bp
(443 bp) of total assets.
The regulatory adjustments are intended to contribute to the safety and soundness of the
banking system, where the ability to absorb losses in going concern is the predominant pru-
dential criterion for including items in regulatory capital. Items that absorb losses should be
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included in regulatory capital. For the same reason, items that do not absorb losses, e.g.,
goodwill and deferred tax assets, are excluded from regulatory capital.
My results show that the regulatory adjustments are unevenly distributed over the sample
population. Low-solvency banks appear to benefit from regulatory adjustments: They report
values of Tier 1 regulatory capital that exceed book equity. They rely on regulatory adjust-
ments to inflate important regulatory solvency ratios such as the Tier 1 leverage ratio and the
Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio.
The low-solvency banks in particular manage the structure of their regulatory capital. They
avoid deductions. More importantly, they issue hybrid capital securities that are substitutes for
costly common equity and have yet to prove the ability to absorb losses. These low-solvency
banks also tend to rely on accounting rules to increase regulatory Tier 1 capital.
This behavior of low-solvency banks reflects the cost of deleveraging. For these banks,
issuing equity is unattractive, as shown by Admati et al. (2013b). As a result, these banks rely
on regulatory adjustments to increase Tier 1 regulatory capital.
In contrast, the use of capital-increasing regulatory adjustments is less prevalent in highly
solvent banks. These banks show a relatively high incidence of regulatory adjustments that
decrease Tier 1 regulatory capital relative to book equity.
The relationship between regulatory adjustments and bank solvency is convex. I use Mer-
ton (1974) to estimate the decreasing relationship between regulatory adjustments and sol-
vency. The three measures of regulatory adjustments that I employ (Tier 1 minus equity;
additions and deductions; and net unrealized gains (losses) on available-for-sale securities)
confirm the expected convex relationship between regulatory adjustments and solvency.
My results indicate that bank solvency rules regarding regulatory adjustments are limited
in their effective contribution to the safety and soundness of the banking system. In fact,
the regulatory adjustments appear to work against the safety and soundness of the banking
system. Weaker banks are “helped” (or choose to be helped) by rules that allow them to
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augment regulatory capital by issuing low-cost equity substitutes. Stronger banks rely less on
additions to Tier 1 capital, but suffer from the impact of deductions.
These results weaken the case for regulatory adjustments, particularly if the regulator of-
fers a set of choices that allows banks to use equity substitutes that more than offset the de-
ductions from capital.
Moreover, low-solvency banks avoid deductible items. Provided that the rules governing
regulatory adjustments are carefully developed and deter banks from engaging in risky ac-
tivities, the application of deductions has prudential merits. However, as the description of
adjustments in Section 1.2 and the Appendix show, some of the deductions may be the result
of a willingness among regulators to conform to the international level playing field. This may
or may not take precedence over issues that concern the safety and soundness of the banking
system.
New capital rules under Basel III have increased the number of adjustment choices for
banks, which may or may not contribute to financial stability. Perhaps the most effective
contribution of Basel III to the safety and soundness of the banking system is the requirement
to hold more capital than before. This is expected to lower the incentive to avoid deductions,
and it may deter banks from adding items to capital that may not be able to absorb losses
effectively.
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APPENDIX: CONTROVERSY ON UNREALIZED GAINS AND LOSSES
During the global financial crisis, banks with unrealized losses reported inflated solvency ratios,
attracting criticism from academics (e.g., Ball 2008) as well as from bank regulators. In a response
to the global financial crisis, bank regulators decided to change the rules with respect to the exclusion
of unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale securities from regulatory capital, although this
decision is not set in stone.
The new Basel III bank solvency rules, endorsed by the G20 in November 2010, currently include
unrealized gains and losses in regulatory capital (BCBS 2010). However, this is only temporary, and
it also depends on the way that countries implement Basel III, because the position of the Basel Com-
mittee, and perhaps its members, on this issue is ambiguous. For example, the consultation version of
the Basel III rules issued in December 2009 proposes including unrealized gains and unrealized losses
on available-for-sale securities in regulatory capital. The Committee motivated this inclusion because
exclusion has undermined confidence in Tier 1 capital. However, the same consultation version men-
tions, in footnote 17, that the treatment of unrealized gains will be reviewed by the Basel Committee
during 2010 (BCBS 2009). With this promise to review the treatment of unrealized gains, the Basel
Committee may have relied on the November publication of the first phase of the reform of financial
securities accounting, IFRS 9 (IASB 2009). This first presentation of IFRS 9 Phase 1 abandons the
available-for-sale securities category and related other comprehensive income accounts, thus rendering
an adjustment for unrealized gains and losses void.
If IFRS 9 had entered into force simultaneously with Basel III on January 1, 2013, as originally
envisioned, then this new accounting standard would have rendered the rules on the inclusion of unre-
alized gains and unrealized losses in regulatory capital irrelevant—initially for IFRS adopters, but with
IFRS and US GAAP expected to converge, the United States would have been likely to follow suit.
In December 2010, the Basel Committee published the final text of the Basel III rules with the new
definition of regulatory capital (BCBS 2010). No change was made regarding the intention to include
unrealized gains and losses in regulatory capital. Neither was there a firm decision on unrealized
gains and losses. The Committee vowed to continue to review their appropriate treatment, taking into
account the evolution of the accounting framework (footnote 10 of the Basel III rules, BCBS 2010).
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The decision of the Committee reflects its awareness of the lack of progress on IFRS 9 and the FASB’s
position at that time of favoring the valuation of all financial instruments at fair value on the balance
sheet, with value changes recognized in other comprehensive income as well as in profit and loss.7 The
accounting standard setters apparently decided to backtrack on the elimination of the available-for-sale
securities category.
From a prudential point of view, a rule that excludes unrealized gains from capital is desirable. To
see why, it is important to distinguish between liquid and illiquid securities held for sale. When secu-
rities are liquid, their unrealized gains can be crystallized by selling. The exclusion of unrealized gains
of liquid securities should therefore not pose a problem for banks. If they want to increase regulatory
capital, they can sell these securities immediately, and this is particularly the case for equity securities,
i.e., shares. However, for illiquid securities, the unrealized gains are more uncertain. Augmenting cap-
ital by selling these securities is not always a quickly implementable option. For this reason, unrealized
gains of illiquid instruments may be excluded from capital.
Regarding the evolution of the accounting framework, in November 2012, the IASB proposed
limited changes to IFRS 9 classification and measurement requirements (IASB 2012). One of these
limited changes is the introduction of a “fair value through other comprehensive income” measurement
category for debt securities that would be based on an entity’s business model. Although presented
as a limited change, this is a serious departure from the intentions of the plans set out by the IFRS in
2008 to reduce the complexity of accounting for financial instruments (IASB 2008). In aligning the
level playing field between the US GAAP and IFRS, the limited changes to IFRS 9 thus add credibility
to the intention of the Basel Committee to continue to review the appropriate accounting treatment of
unrealized gains.
Regarding developments in the United States, the inclusion of unrealized gains and losses applies
only to banks with total assets of over $250 billion (Reuters 2013). These are the largest nine banks,
which at the time of the decision (July 2013), all reported positive values for net unrealized gains
(losses) on available-for-sale securities, with a total of $26.06 billion.8 The nine affected banks thus
benefit from the inclusion of this item in regulatory capital.
7See www.iasplus.com/en/news/2009/September/news5421.
8See http://capitalissues.co/2013/07/15/aoci-rule-effects-nine-banks-affected/.
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Figure 1. Regulatory Capital on FR Y-9C, Bank of America Corporation, 30 June 2013
(Tier 1).
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Figure 2. The Cost of Deleveraging.
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Figure 3. Distribution of two solvency metrics.
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Figure 4. Regulatory adjustments plotted against bank solvency.
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Figure 5. Estimated values of regulatory adjustments.
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TABLE 1
REGULATORY ADJUSTMENTS APPLIED TO TIER 1 CAPITAL, 2001–2013.
Description Period Effect Value in bp Value if item 6=0
Qualifying trust-preferred securities [C502] 2004–2008 Addition 95 176
Qualifying restricted core capital elements (other than cumulative perpetual preferred stock) [G215] 2009–2013 Addition 92 150
Qualifying mandatory convertible preferred securities of internationally active bank holding companies [G216] 2009–2013 Addition 0 118
Nonqualifying perpetual preferred stock [B588] 2001–2013 Deduction 0 –71
Disallowed goodwill and other disallowed intangible assets [B590] 2001–2013 Deduction –72 –104
Disallowed servicing assets and purchased credit card relationships [B591] 2001–2013 Deduction –1 –3
Qualifying Class A noncontrolling (minority) interests in consolidated subsidiaries [G214] [B589] 2001–2013 Addition 22 115
Disallowed deferred tax assets [5610] 2001–2013 Deduction –5 –50
net unrealized gains (losses) on available-for-sale securities [8434] 2001–2013 Symmetric, neutralized –9 –9
Net unrealized loss on available-for-sale equity securities [A221] 2001–2013 Loss is deducted –1 –4
Cumulative change in fair value of all financial liabilities accounted for under a fair value option that is included
in retained earnings and is attributable to changes in the bank holding company’s own creditworthiness [F246]
2007–2013 Symmetric, neutralized 0 –6
Accumulated net gains (losses) on cash flow hedges [4336] and, from year-end of 2012 on: amounts recorded
in AOCI resulting from the initial and subsequent application of FASB ASC 715-20 (former FASB statement
No. 158) to defined benefit postretirement plans
2001–2013 Symmetric, neutralized –2 –14
Other additions to (deductions from) Tier 1 capital [B592] 2001–2013 Symmetric 0 13
NOTES: Regulatory adjustments for US bank holding companies covering the quarters 2001Q1–2013Q2. Additions increase, and Deductions decrease Tier 1 capital [8274] relative to book
equity: total bank holding-company equity capital [3210]. A Symmetric adjustment adds to and deducts from Tier 1 capital. Neutralized means the adjustment renders a fair valued item
into accounting cost. Value in bp is the average annual year-end value of the adjustment expressed in bp of the average total assets [3368]. Value if item 6=0 excludes quarterly values where
a bank holding company reports nil for an item. Source of the definitions is: www.federalreserve.gov/apps/reportforms. All codes in square brackets are reported in Consolidated Financial
Statements for Bank Holding Companies (FR Y-9C). Definitions of items are from the Micro Data Reference Manual of the Federal Reserve board (www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/mdrm/
DataDictionary/Search.cfm).
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TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF US BANK HOLDING COMPANIES ON REPORT FR Y-9C OVER TIME.
Year EquityA %
Tier 1
A %
Tier 1 minus Reg Total Total ROA% BanksEquity (bp) Capital % Equity Assets
2001 8.92 8.63 -28.4 14.08 342 4,218 1.36 1,724
2002 9.06 8.75 -31.5 14.37 347 4,147 1.45 1,853
2003 8.98 8.98 -0.67 14.69 351 4,305 1.43 1,983
2004 8.94 9.09 15.3 14.48 433 4,918 1.38 2,092
2005 8.82 9.24 41.8 14.36 402 4,877 1.43 2,096
2006 8.79 8.90 11.2 13.24 1,065 12,702 1.43 778
2007 8.80 8.77 -3.07 12.83 1,026 13,325 1.12 773
2008 8.52 8.58 6.24 12.73 1,209 13,676 0.04 786
2009 8.59 8.65 5.63 13.67 1,283 14,181 -0.37 819
2010 8.94 9.01 6.97 14.95 1,347 14,207 0.31 822
2011 9.63 9.43 -19.9 15.82 1,371 13,875 0.66 839
2012 9.95 9.65 -30.4 16.00 1,467 14,146 0.95 845
2013 9.82 9.79 -1.70 15.99 1,483 13,898 0.54 841
Year Disallowed Sym Adj Core Elemts Loans % Funding Disallowed Credit QuartersGoodwill (bp) AFS (bp) & Trups (bp) Gap % DTA (bp) Growth (%)
2001 -48.1 -16.3 65.3 -16.5 -1.42 -0.62 6,720
2002 -49.9 -34.8 64.9 -16.8 -1.23 4.04 7,189
2003 -51.0 -16.9 64.8 -16.4 -1.17 5.16 7,760
2004 -56.7 -4.99 66.8 -14.0 -1.33 10.7 8,202
2005 -57.8 15.7 82.7 68.1 -13.3 -1.37 2.41 8,427
2006 -107 7.32 111 70.1 -8.64 -1.82 -16.9 3,073
2007 -113 -1.15 111 71.6 -6.11 -1.87 3,108
2008 -101 3.97 105 71.8 -6.23 -5.98 0.51 3,168
2009 -82.5 -6.75 97.1 67.0 -12.4 -9.58 -3.80 3,321
2010 -80.4 -3.44 94.9 63.8 -16.4 -12.5 -0.02 3,335
2011 -78.5 -28.4 88.3 62.4 -19.3 -12.2 0.41 3,346
2012 -77.4 -33.0 82.3 62.8 -20.4 -12.4 2.32 3,413
2013 -72.6 7.26 75.3 62.5 -19.3 -15.4 0.84 1,694
NOTES: The table reports mean values at the end of fiscal year (Q4) for the years 2001–2012 and for June 30 (Q2) of 2013. Except for Banks and Quarters and the items that are preceded
by ‘Total’ (which are expressed in $ millions), all items are standardized by average total assets [3368], or A. Equity and Total Equity are total bank holding-company equity capital [3210],
Tier 1 is Tier 1 capital [8274], Reg Capital is Total risk-based capital [3792], Total Assets is average total assets [3368], ROA is Return on Assets: income (loss) before income taxes and
extraordinary items, and other adjustments [4301] over total assets [2710]. Banks is the number of sample banks at year-end, as well as at end of Q2 of 2013. Disallowed Goodwill is
Disallowed goodwill and other disallowed intangible assets [B590], Sym Adj AFS is net unrealized gains (losses) on available-for-sale securities [8434], where positive (negative) values
indicate unrealized gains (losses). Core Elem. & Trups is Qualifying restricted core capital elements (other than cumulative perpetual preferred stock) [G215] for the years 2009–2013,
and, for the years 2004–2008: Qualifying trust-preferred securities [C502]. Loans is Loans and leases net of unearned income and allowance [B529] [2125] and Loans and leases held for
sale [5369], Funding gap is the difference between loans and deposits, where deposits is the sum of interest bearing and non-interest bearing deposits [6631] and [6636]. Disallowed DTA
is Disallowed deferred tax assets [5610], Credit growth or Credit is the aggregate change in the value of Loans of all sample banks relative to the value of total assets of the sample banks
over four quarters, and Quarters is the number of quarterly bank observations. All codes in square brackets are reported in Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies
(FR Y-9C). Definitions of items are from the Micro Data Reference Manual of the Federal Reserve board (www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/mdrm/DataDictionary/Search.cfm).
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TABLE 3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF POOLED DATA.
Mean Min. p5 p25 Median p75 p95 Max.
Tier 1 minus Equity (bp) -5 -443 -235 -72 -11 83 211 311
Additions (bp) 79 0 0 0 21 165 242 569
Deductions (bp) -85 -589 -307 -119 -46 -11 0 0
Equity
A
(%) 9.03 2.32 5.37 7.36 8.80 10.39 13.63 19.20
Tier 1
A
(%) 8.98 1.96 5.99 7.60 8.71 10.04 13.02 18.42
1
S 12.0 5.2 7.3 9.6 11.4 13.6 18.6 43.1
Net use of adjustments (Incl.) -0.84 -6 -3 -2 -1 0 1 4
Sym Adj AFS (bp) -11 -470 -66 -24 -6 4 33 389
Funding Gap (%) -14.5 -97.9 -39.9 -23.3 -13.5 -5.0 6.9 91.2
Tier 2 LLA (bp) 81 0 46 70 83 94 108 270
Total Assets ($m) 8,061 95 170 276 592 1,165 8,837 2,520,000
Risk 0.72 0.16 0.52 0.65 0.72 0.79 0.89 1.00
ROA (%) 1.11 -15.7 -0.71 0.80 1.28 1.67 2.34 8.43
Liquid assets (%) 4.69 0.02 1.48 2.49 3.55 5.34 11.8 61.3
Credit (%) 2.57 -21.3 -4.0 0.48 3.01 6.22 10.7 11.0
NOTES: The table reports statistics for US bank holding companies over quarters 2001Q1–2013Q2, for 62,756 observations. pn refers
to percentile n values. Tier 1 minus Equity is Tier 1 capital [8274] less total bank holding-company equity capital [3210] in basis points
of average total assets [3368], where A denotes the latter. Additions (Deductions) are the aggregate values of items that Table 1 identifies
as Addition (Deduction), including the positive (negative) amounts of the Symmetric items. 1S is the reciprocal of solvency: Average
total assets over total bank holding-company equity capital. Tier 1 is Tier 1 capital [8274]. Net use of adjustments is the sum of the use
of adjustments mentioned in Table 1: positive adjustments increase the net sum, negative adjustments decrease the net sum; symmetric
adjustments are included. Sym Adj AFS is net unrealized gains (losses) on available-for-sale securities [8434] in basis points of A. Funding
gap is the difference between loans and deposits, as a % of A, where loans is Loans and leases net of unearned income and allowance
[B529 and 2125] and Loans and leases held for sale [5369]; deposits is the sum of interest bearing and non-interest bearing deposits
[6631 and 6636]. Tier 2 LLA is the allowance for loan and lease losses includible in Tier 2 capital [5310] in basis points of A. Total
Assets is average total assets [3368] in millions of dollars. Risk is risk-weighted assets over total assets: ([A223] over [2170]). ROA
is Return on Assets: income (loss) before income taxes and extraordinary items, and other adjustments [4301] over total assets [2710],
measured at year-end. Liquid assets is cash and balances due from depository institutions [0010] as a % of A. Credit, or credit growth
is the aggregate change in the value of Loans of all sample banks relative to the aggregate value of A of the sample banks. The change
is measured over the period of a year (four quarters). All codes in square brackets are reported in Consolidated Financial Statements
for Bank Holding Companies (FR Y-9C). Definitions of items are from the Micro Data Reference Manual of the Federal Reserve board
(www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/mdrm/DataDictionary/Search.cfm).
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TABLE 4
ESTIMATION OF THE VALUE OF REGULATORY ADJUSTMENTS: TIER 1 MINUS EQUITY.
β p β p
1
S 16.6 0.00 16.0 0.00
Risk 159 0.00
Size -22.9 0.00
Tier 2 LLA 1,404 0.22
Funding Gap 33.9 0.03
ROA 527 0.05
Liquid assets 127 0.00
Credit –2006 19.4 0.84
Credit 2006 -172 0.16
Credit 2007- 187 0.15
New York 23.0 0.06
Philadelphia 7.51 0.51
Cleveland -15.6 0.13
Richmond 17.7 0.07
Atlanta 7.28 0.43
Chicago -7.92 0.38
St. Louis 9.92 0.29
Minneapolis -3.99 0.71
Kansas City 5.21 0.62
Dallas 11.1 0.27
San Francisco 15.3 0.17
Intercept -204 0.00 -26.4 0.46
Prob > F 0.00 0.00
R2 0.24 0.31
NOTES: This table shows regression results of regulatory adjustments (∆) for US bank holding companies over the quarters covering
2001Q1–2013Q2, for 62,756 quarterly observations. The dependent variable is the difference between Tier 1 capital and total bank
holding-company equity capital; both standardized for Average total assets.
∆i,t = β0 +β1 1Si,t + εi,t
∆i,t = β0 +β1 1Si,t +β2Riski,t +β3Sizei,t +β4Tier 2 LLAi,t +β5Funding gapi,t
+β6ROAi,t +β7Liquid assetsi,t +β8Crediti,t +β9Ii,t,2006 ·Crediti,t
+β10Ii,t,2007−2013 ·Crediti,t +
12
∑
j=2
β j+9Districti,t, j + ε
The regression model relies on p-values that account for the two dimensions (banks (i) and quarters (t)) of within-cluster correlation
(Petersen 2009). p-values are one-sided for 1S , the intercept, Risk, and the Funding Gap. To control for outliers, observations in the
highest and lowest percentile of variables affected are eliminated from the sample. 1S is the reciprocal of solvency: Average total
assets over total bank holding-company equity capital. Risk is risk-weighted assets over total assets: ([A223] over [2170]). Size
is the natural log of one dollar plus the value of total assets [2710] in thousands of dollars. Tier 2 LLA is the allowance for loan
and lease losses includible in Tier 2 capital [5310]. Funding gap is the difference between loans and deposits, where the former
is Loans and leases net of unearned income and allowance [B529] [2125] and Loans and leases held for sale [5369]; and the
latter is the sum of interest bearing and non-interest bearing deposits [6631] and [6636]. ROA is Return on Assets: income (loss)
before income taxes and extraordinary items, and other adjustments [4301] over total assets [2710], measured at year-end. Liquid
assets is cash and balances due from depository institutions [0010]. Credit, or credit growth is the aggregate change in the value
of Loans of all sample banks relative to the aggregate value of total assets of the sample banks. The change is measured over the
period of a year (four quarters). The change in supervisory threshold for submitting the FR Y-9C reports requires the use of an
indicator variable for observations of 2006 as well as one for the years after 2006. New York–San Francisco are indicator variables
for the 12 Federal Reserve districts, where coefficients are relative to the first district: Boston. All codes in square brackets are
reported in Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (FR Y-9C). Definitions of items are from the Micro
Data Reference Manual of the Federal Reserve board (www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/mdrm/DataDictionary/Search.cfm)
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TABLE 5
SIGNED ADJUSTMENTS APPLIED TO TIER 1 CAPITAL.
Additions Deductions
β p β p β p β p
1
S 9.11 0.00 8.42 0.00 5.43 0.00 5.42 0.00
Risk 59.9 0.00 64.6 0.00
Size 14.5 0.00 -33.5 0.00
Tier 2 LLA 2,664 0.00 -1,324 0.18
Funding Gap 29.7 0.01 6.67 0.62
ROA -472 0.07 576 0.00
Liquid assets -80.0 0.01 201 0.00
Credit –2006 -6.23 0.95 58.8 0.11
Credit 2006 -172 0.13 -63.4 0.18
Credit 2007- 377 0.01 -173 0.01
New York 13.2 0.11 10.7 0.33
Philadelphia 11.9 0.15 -6.83 0.53
Cleveland 12.0 0.17 -19.8 0.08
Richmond 27.3 0.00 -10.0 0.29
Atlanta 10.8 0.11 2.64 0.75
Chicago 11.0 0.11 -13.8 0.11
St. Louis 22.6 0.00 -14.0 0.12
Minneapolis 25.2 0.00 -28.6 0.00
Kansas City 27.0 0.00 -22.0 0.02
Dallas 35.5 0.00 -24.3 0.01
San Francisco 17.2 0.03 0.73 0.94
Intercept -30.5 0.00 -292 0.00 -150 0.00 264 0.00
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.14 0.25 0.04 0.24
NOTES: This table shows regression results of regulatory adjustments (∆) for US bank holding companies over the quarters cov-
ering 2001Q1–2013Q2, for 62,756 quarterly observations. The dependent variables separately records Additions and Deductions
as defined by Table 1.
∆i,t = β0 +β1 1Si,t + εi,t
∆i,t = β0 +β1 1Si,t +β2Riski,t +β3Sizei,t +β4Tier 2 LLAi,t +β5Funding gapi,t
+β6ROAi,t +β7Liquid assetsi,t +β8Crediti,t +β9Ii,t,2006 ·Crediti,t
+β10Ii,t,2007−2013 ·Crediti,t +
12
∑
j=2
β j+9Districti,t, j + ε
The regression model relies on p-values that account for the two dimensions (banks (i) and quarters (t)) of within-cluster correla-
tion (Petersen 2009). p-values are one-sided for 1S , the intercept, Risk, and the Funding Gap. To control for outliers, observations
in the highest and lowest percentile of variables affected are eliminated from the sample. 1S is the reciprocal of solvency: Average
total assets over total bank holding-company equity capital. Risk is risk-weighted assets over total assets: ([A223] over [2170]).
Size is the natural log of one dollar plus the value of total assets [2710] in thousands of dollars. Tier 2 LLA is the allowance for
loan and lease losses includible in Tier 2 capital [5310]. Funding gap is the difference between loans and deposits, where the
former is Loans and leases net of unearned income and allowance [B529] [2125] and Loans and leases held for sale [5369]; and
the latter is the sum of interest bearing and non-interest bearing deposits [6631] and [6636]. ROA is Return on Assets: income
(loss) before income taxes and extraordinary items, and other adjustments [4301] over total assets [2710], measured at year-end.
Liquid assets is cash and balances due from depository institutions [0010]. Credit, or credit growth is the aggregate change in the
value of Loans of all sample banks relative to the aggregate value of total assets of the sample banks. The change is measured over
the period of a year (four quarters). The change in supervisory threshold for submitting the FR Y-9C reports requires the use of an
indicator variable for observations of 2006 as well as one for the years after 2006. New York–San Francisco are indicator variables
for the 12 Federal Reserve districts, where coefficients are relative to the first district: Boston. All codes in square brackets are
reported in Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (FR Y-9C). Definitions of items are from the Micro
Data Reference Manual of the Federal Reserve board (www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/mdrm/DataDictionary/Search.cfm)
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TABLE 6
ADJUSTMENTS FOR NET UNREALIZED GAINS (LOSSES) ON AVAILABLE-FOR-SALE SECURITIES.
β p β p
1
S 2.03 0.00 1.63 0.00
Risk 65.4 0.00
Size 0.81 0.21
Tier 2 LLA -1,877 0.00
Funding Gap 15.8 0.03
ROA -300 0.09
Liquid assets 19.7 0.26
Credit –2006 102 0.07
Credit 2006 -249 0.00
Credit 2007- 83.0 0.41
New York 4.55 0.16
Philadelphia -2.34 0.51
Cleveland -6.11 0.09
Richmond -0.50 0.87
Atlanta -1.08 0.74
Chicago -9.60 0.00
St. Louis -1.97 0.51
Minneapolis -8.10 0.01
Kansas City -7.05 0.03
Dallas -2.33 0.50
San Francisco -1.39 0.66
Intercept -35.3 0.00 -71.1 0.00
Prob > F 0.00 0.00
R2 0.05 0.14
NOTES: This table shows regression results of regulatory adjustments (∆) for US bank holding companies over the quarters covering
2001Q1–2013Q2, for 62,756 quarterly observations. The dependent variables are the adjustments for net unrealized gains (losses) on
available-for-sale securities [8434], a deduction, multiplied by –1.
∆i,t = β0 +β1 1Si,t + εi,t
∆i,t = β0 +β1 1Si,t +β2Riski,t +β3Sizei,t +β4Tier 2 LLAi,t +β5Funding gapi,t
+β6ROAi,t +β7Liquid assetsi,t +β8Crediti,t +β9Ii,t,2006 ·Crediti,t
+β10Ii,t,2007−2013 ·Crediti,t +
12
∑
j=2
β j+9Districti,t, j + ε
The regression model relies on p-values that account for the two dimensions (banks (i) and quarters (t)) of within-cluster correlation
(Petersen 2009). 1S is the reciprocal of solvency: Average total assets over total bank holding-company equity capital. Risk is risk-
weighted assets over total assets: ([A223] over [2170]). Size is the natural log of one dollar plus the value of total assets [2710] in
thousands of dollars. Tier 2 LLA is the allowance for loan and lease losses includible in Tier 2 capital [5310]. Funding gap is the
difference between loans and deposits, where the former is Loans and leases net of unearned income and allowance [B529] [2125] and
Loans and leases held for sale [5369]; and the latter is the sum of interest bearing and non-interest bearing deposits [6631] and [6636].
ROA is Return on Assets: income (loss) before income taxes and extraordinary items, and other adjustments [4301] over total assets
[2710], measured at year-end. Liquid assets is cash and balances due from depository institutions [0010]. Credit, or credit growth is
the aggregate change in the value of Loans of all sample banks relative to the aggregate value of total assets of the sample banks. The
change is measured over the period of a year (four quarters). The change in supervisory threshold for submitting the FR Y-9C reports
requires the use of an indicator variable for observations of 2006 as well as one for the years after 2006. New York–San Francisco are
indicator variables for the 12 Federal Reserve districts, where coefficients are relative to the first district: Boston. All codes in square
brackets are reported in Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (FR Y-9C). Definitions of items are from the
Micro Data Reference Manual of the Federal Reserve board (www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/mdrm/DataDictionary/Search.cfm)
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TABLE 7
NET USE OF CATEGORIES OF REGULATORY ADJUSTMENTS.
Net Sum of Positive Adjustments, Ex. Net Sum of Positive Adjustments, Incl.
β p β p β p β p
1
S 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.00
Risk 0.74 0.00 1.84 0.00
Size -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.41
Tier 2 LLA 8.17 0.37 -38.0 0.01
Funding Gap -0.22 0.11 -0.28 0.10
ROA 6.87 0.00 0.62 0.93
Liquid assets 0.28 0.35 -0.84 0.07
Credit –2006 0.74 0.05 4.12 0.09
Credit 2006 -1.47 0.00 -10.4 0.00
Credit 2007- 0.83 0.30 7.78 0.08
New York 0.34 0.00 0.35 0.00
Philadelphia 0.16 0.17 0.08 0.53
Cleveland 0.17 0.06 0.04 0.72
Richmond 0.52 0.00 0.46 0.00
Atlanta 0.52 0.00 0.46 0.00
Chicago 0.29 0.00 0.06 0.53
St. Louis 0.51 0.00 0.37 0.00
Minneapolis 0.41 0.00 0.18 0.06
Kansas City 0.48 0.00 0.25 0.01
Dallas 0.54 0.00 0.39 0.00
San Francisco 0.35 0.00 0.26 0.01
Intercept -1.29 0.00 -1.66 0.00 -1.88 0.00 -3.07 0.00
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.14
NOTES: This table shows regression results of regulatory adjustments (∆) for US bank holding companies over the quarters covering
2001Q1–2013Q2, for 62,756 quarterly observations. The dependent variable is the net sum of regulatory adjustments employed. The
net sum is the sum of the use of adjustments mentioned in Table 1: positive adjustments increase the net sum, negative adjustments
decrease the net sum. “Ex.” (“Incl.”) means that symmetric adjustments are excluded from (included in) the net sum of used regulatory
adjustments.
∆i,t = β0 +β1 1Si,t + εi,t
∆i,t = β0 +β1 1Si,t +β2Riski,t +β3Sizei,t +β4Tier 2 LLAi,t +β5Funding gapi,t
+β6ROAi,t +β7Liquid assetsi,t +β8Crediti,t +β9Ii,t,2006 ·Crediti,t
+β10Ii,t,2007−2013 ·Crediti,t +
12
∑
j=2
β j+9Districti,t, j + ε
The regression model relies on p-values that account for the two dimensions (banks (i) and quarters (t)) of within-cluster correlation
(Petersen 2009). p-values are one-sided for 1S , the intercept, Risk, and the Funding Gap. To control for outliers, observations in the
highest and lowest percentile of variables affected are eliminated from the sample. 1S is the reciprocal of solvency: Average total
assets over total bank holding-company equity capital. Risk is risk-weighted assets over total assets: ([A223] over [2170]). Size
is the natural log of one dollar plus the value of total assets [2710] in thousands of dollars. Tier 2 LLA is the allowance for loan
and lease losses includible in Tier 2 capital [5310]. Funding gap is the difference between loans and deposits, where the former is
Loans and leases net of unearned income and allowance [B529] [2125] and Loans and leases held for sale [5369]; and the latter
is the sum of interest bearing and non-interest bearing deposits [6631] and [6636]. ROA is Return on Assets: income (loss) before
income taxes and extraordinary items, and other adjustments [4301] over total assets [2710], measured at year-end. Liquid assets
is cash and balances due from depository institutions [0010]. Credit, or credit growth is the aggregate change in the value of Loans
of all sample banks relative to the aggregate value of total assets of the sample banks. The change is measured over the period of a
year (four quarters). The change in supervisory threshold for submitting the FR Y-9C reports requires the use of an indicator variable
for observations of 2006 as well as one for the years after 2006. New York–San Francisco are indicator variables for the 12 Federal
Reserve districts, where coefficients are relative to the first district: Boston. All codes in square brackets are reported in Consolidated
Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (FR Y-9C). Definitions of items are from the Micro Data Reference Manual of the
Federal Reserve board (www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/mdrm/DataDictionary/Search.cfm)
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